Finance Research Seminar - Mike BURKART
Mike BURKART - LSE London School of Economics and Political Science
Friday 28 February 2020 (10h30 - 12h00) - Extranef - 126
"The Social Value of Debt in the Market for Corporate Control" which is joint with Samuel Lee (Santa Clara University) and Henrik Petri (University of Bath).
The free-rider problem in takeovers is in essence a (coordination) failure to "negotiate" mutually beneficial terms. Means for bidders to unilaterally seize gains could solve this issue but target shareholders prefer to limit such means. We show that takeover debt can bridge this divide in that debt constraints can serve as Pareto-improving ``sharing rules." In this theory (i) leveraged buyouts are privately and socially optimal and (ii) competing bidders raise more debt, amplifying gains to target shareholders and in takeover efficiency. At its best, leveraging bids neutralizes the free-rider problem---to mutual benefit.