Seminar in Microeconomics - Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne)
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices: Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Objects
Tuesday 3 December 2019 (12h15 - 13h30) - Extranef - 109
We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (2019), serial dictators- hip mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor, 2019, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality: mechanism ϕ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, neutrality, and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering >- such that ϕ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and >-.